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Africa Review

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30 November 1984

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Africa Review

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Articles have been coordinated as appropriate with other offices within CIA. Comments and queries regarding this publication may be directed to the Chief, Production Staff, Office of African and Latin American Analysis

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Articles

Indian Ocean: Reaction to Soviet Initiatives

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The Soviet Union is courting the Indian Ocean island states with limited offers of military assistance and economic cooperation in an effort to encourage leftist political elements, undercut Western influence, and offset growing Western military capability in the region. Moscow seeks to expand its presence, build ties to area political and military figures, and, in the long term, acquire access to air and naval facilities.

Soviet efforts notwithstanding, however, it is our judgment that Moscow's influence in the region now appears to be waning. Concern among the leaders of the island states over the domestic and international consequences of close alignment with the Soviet Union has blunted recent Soviet initiatives and prompted at least a temporary swing to the West. Regional leaders fear Soviet meddling in their domestic affairs and are publicly reasserting their nonaligned posture.

Soviet Inducements

Reluctant to commit more than token levels of economic assistance in courting Indian Ocean governments, Moscow has attempted instead to exploit the security concerns of local leaders in an effort to foster dependence on Soviet military assistance. This tactic has proved particularly successful with the prosocialist regimes in Seychelles and Madagascar, where the leaders believe that the potential for domestic upheaval or external destabilization is high.

Seychelles. President Rene has long been fearful of coup plotting—by both his own military and external opposition groups. His near paranoia over security has facilitated Soviet efforts to preserve and expand existing military relations. For example, Moscow

repeatedly has sent warships to the area to demonstrate support for Rene's regime during periods of insecurity, and has provided military equipment with associated training packages to the Seychellois Army. More recently, Moscow provided Rene with a communications network—linked to similar Soviet-installed facilities in neighboring Tanzania, Madagascar, and Mozambique—for use in an emergency situation. Additional Soviet projects include building two small ship repair facilities, and refurbishing and filling fuel storage tanks on nearby St. Anne Island.

Madagascar. The Soviets have played on President Ratsiraka's fears of possible South African-backed coup plotting to emplace a signals intelligence network. The network, ostensibly for defensive purposes, has the capability to monitor Western ships and aircraft in the Indian Ocean region. Over the past year, Moscow reportedly has offered five patrol boats and training assistance for Malagasy security forces. The Soviets have requested port access for Soviet warships. Although Moscow has supplied most of Madagascar's military equipment since the mid-1970s, assistance levels have dropped in recent years.

Mauritius and Comoros. Moscow's attempts to gain influence with both countries focus on developing economic and military ties. The Soviets reportedly have made several proposals to Mauritius, including expanded economic ties, Aeroflot landing rights, and visits by Soviet warships.

the Soviets have offered to supply Mauritius with a small cargo ship and assist with coastal surveillance.

Indian Ocean Response

The emergence of leftist regimes in postindependence Seychelles and Madagascar, combined with the Mauritian shift toward nonalignment and the traditional pro-West inclination of Comoros, has resulted in a mixed regional response to Soviet initiatives. Political and economic considerations, however, have influenced recent decisions by Indian Ocean leaders that have temporarily hampered Moscow's efforts in the region.

Rene depends upon a show of Soviet political and military support to bolster his fragile Seychelles regime. Rene, however, now faces potentially serious domestic fallout over continued close relations with Moscow in the aftermath of unexpectedly strong popular opposition to the Soviet presence. As a result, he is attempting to project an image of greater nonalignment. Last October, Rene publicly affirmed he would not allow foreign bases to be established in Seychelles. The President also indicated recently to US Embassy officials that he wants to renegotiate the terms of agreement for the USAF tracking station in Seychelles—both as a bid for increased payments to offset a short-term decline in revenues, and as a further demonstration of his nonaligned posture.

Ratsiraka faces an array of economic difficulties in Madagascar and is now turning to the West for assistance. In our judgment, his recent statement to US Embassy officials that Madagascar would close the Soviet-supplied signals intelligence network indicates a willingness to make certain political concessions as an inducement to the West to grant

substantial aid. Ratsiraka continues to depend on Moscow, however, for military equipment, training, and spare parts.

The leaders of Mauritius and Comoros probably harbor suspicions that the Soviet Union tacitly supports leftist elements in their governments, and they have consistently rebuffed most of Moscow's overtures.

Prime Minister Jugnauth feels rebuffed by a recent US decision to limit Mauritian export quotas, however, and may now try to develop closer economic relations with East Bloc countries.

The Soviets may be encouraged by Abdallah's recent acceptance of scholarships for 13 Comoran students. We believe, however, that he accepted the offer as a political gesture to demonstrate mild displeasure with relatively low levels of Western economic assistance.

Outlook

The Soviet Union almost certainly will continue to look for openings to sustain and expand its presence and influence. Moscow may press for air and naval access rights, though such access is not essential to its operations in the area. In our judgment, the Soviets are unlikely to devote substantial resources in pursuit of these objectives.

Moscow is unlikely to achieve significant political gains in Mauritius and Comoros as long as the current leadership perceives that their interests continue to lie with the West. Soviet influence probably will remain stronger in Seychelles and Madagascar. Rene and Ratsiraka are firmly committed to their own form of socialism, but political and economic factors almost certainly will prevent either leader from granting Moscow the air and naval access it seeks.

Soviet influence in the region will fluctuate as conflicting national interests dictate that Indian Ocean leaders acquire both adequate defense systems and substantial economic assistance. Moscow's

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inducements in courting the Indian Ocean states are not likely to appear attractive enough at present to offset the potential political risk of losing Western economic aid. Nevertheless, the unpredictable nature of regional personalities and politics may periodically bring to power elements inclined to move closer to Moscow.

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Tanzania: Growing Military Discontent

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Discontent in the Tanzanian military, which until now has been confined to the lower ranks, is beginning to spread to the senior levels. Complaints also are being heard again from troops on the island of Zanzibar. Senior officers are increasingly concerned over deteriorating economic conditions, lack of promotions, President Nyerere's attempts to institute party supremacy, and the possible loss of special privileges now accorded them. Among the lower ranks, longstanding complaints about lack of supplies and training and abuse of privileges by senior officers continue to erode morale. [REDACTED]

Complaints Among Senior Ranks

Senior military officers, traditionally loyal to Nyerere, are vital to his control of the 42,000-man Defense Force. Recent events, however, have given rise to growing rifts among military leaders and sparked their unusual expression of dissatisfaction with Nyerere's rule. [REDACTED]

Internal Rivalries. Political infighting between Minister of Defense Kimario and Chief of Defense Force Musuguri has resulted in the rescinding of all promotions granted since September 1983. [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] Musuguri is slated to retire in early 1985, but his health problems and political difficulties with Kimario may force him out prematurely. Any successor to Musuguri will be forced to deal with the same rivalries with Kimario, who appears anxious to demonstrate his ultimate authority over military matters. Nyerere may have difficulty finding a replacement who is willing and able to deal with the Defense Minister. [REDACTED]

Opposition to Party Supremacy. Complaints against Nyerere's economic policies are not new in military circles, but the hope that the economic situation would improve with Nyerere's scheduled retirement as President in late 1985—clearing the way for a successor who might alter the socialist policies that are preventing an economic recovery—has mitigated

criticism in the past. Now, however, the growing realization that Nyerere intends to maintain control of domestic policy through his position as party chairman—a position he plans to retain even after he relinquishes the presidency—reportedly is frustrating hopes for economic improvement. [REDACTED]

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Continuing Complaints From the Lower Ranks

Recent signs of discontent among senior officers come against a backdrop of longstanding grievances on the part of lower ranking members of the Tanzanian military. The lack of adequate housing, clothing, supplies, and equipment causes constant grumbling among the troops. The lower ranks also criticize the preferential treatment and special privileges accorded to senior officers and resent their frequent abuses of power. For example, goods which are intended for all levels of the military are snapped up by senior officers for personal use or for sale on the black market. [REDACTED]

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[REDACTED] food shortages have become so severe that military personnel of all levels are forced to find their own provisions. Low salaries and the effective lack of promotions since September 1983 also have taken their toll on morale. [REDACTED]

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Treason Trials

The treason trials for 19 defendants accused of involvement in a January 1983 coup plot allegedly involving some senior officers have added to tensions

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in the military. During the recently concluded preliminary proceedings, low-ranking military defendants raised numerous accusations against various senior officers—including Major General Kombe, Chief of the Tanzanian Intelligence and Security Service—who may be called upon to testify in higher court, [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] Nyerere has indicated he will remove from command and place under house arrest all those called to testify in the high court trials, scheduled to begin in late January.

In contrast, [REDACTED] troops by and large favor the prosecution and are hoping heavy sentences will be handed down—a view that apparently places the interests of junior and senior levels in direct conflict. [REDACTED] the lower ranks are watching the proceedings closely to see if implicated senior officers will be found guilty and receive sentences similar to those given to junior officers. [REDACTED]

Zanzibari Discontent

In addition to the causes of discontent shared with the mainland military, personnel from Zanzibar have special concerns of their own. [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] current Zanzibari demands are similar to those which preceded the unrest in late 1983 and early 1984 and ended in the forced resignation of Zanzibar President Aboud Jumbe. Zanzibari troops want an increased share of:

- Senior military positions.
- Specialized training courses abroad.
- Large weapons stationed on Zanzibar. [REDACTED]

Internal problems also have erupted among Zanzibari military personnel. [REDACTED]

there is a sharp division between levels of leadership of the military division stationed on the island. In addition, a serious race problem reportedly is developing between black and Arab Zanzibari soldiers over alleged favoritism toward Arabs.

Defense Force officials are taking these problems seriously and have begun to study ways of relieving tensions. [REDACTED]

Outlook

Nyerere remains dependent on the loyalty of his senior officers to mitigate the threat posed by military discontent. As long as he can guarantee their preferential treatment and special privileges, he is likely to retain that support. If, however, Nyerere mishandles the two issues most directly bearing on their interests—economic reform and the treason trials—he runs the risk of seriously undermining his base of support. [REDACTED]

Similarly, Nyerere will have to resolve at least some of the complaints from lower levels in order to defuse tensions. Economic constraints will complicate any effort to raise living standards, however, and an attempt to achieve a more equitable balance of perquisites between junior and senior ranks would further weaken his senior-level support. [REDACTED]

Although there is no evidence of any current effort to mount a serious coup attempt, failure to deal with the military's problems over the longer term could lead to any of several plausible coup scenarios:

- A "palace coup" by high-level officers moving to protect parochial interests threatened by the civilian government or to preempt a coup from lower military ranks.
- A broad-based coup drawing support from all ranks to protect perceived military interests in a deteriorating economic situation.
- A "grassroots" coup fomented by the lower ranks against a civilian and military leadership unable or unwilling to provide them the basic necessities.

Zanzibari troops do not have the manpower to mount a coup of their own, but their separatist activities could act as a catalyst for opposition in other sectors of the military. [REDACTED]

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Zaire: Rebel Attack in Shaba [REDACTED]

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Zairian rebels attacked and held the small town of Moba in eastern Shaba for two days last month—the first rebel incident in the province since a major invasion in 1978. Government forces quickly restored control, however, and the Mobutu regime was never threatened. We have been unable to identify the rebels or the numbers involved. The rebel force probably was comprised of local dissidents, but several unconfirmed reports [REDACTED] suggest that responsibility lies with a Tanzanian-based dissident group that has received training and assistance from Libya. [REDACTED]

The Moba affair represents the first opportunity since the 1978 Shaba invasion to assess the Zairian military in a crisis situation. In our view, although Zairian capabilities have clearly improved, Kinshasa probably would have required substantial Western assistance to combat a rebel force similar to the ones that invaded Shaba in 1977 and 1978. [REDACTED]

The Moba attack may have been only a local incident, but, if Zairian claims of Libyan and Tanzanian complicity prove true, it could foreshadow an increase in Tanzanian-based dissident activity in 1985. At a minimum, we believe the international publicity given to the rebel attack—particularly because it follows the widely publicized but unfounded coup rumors in Kinshasa last month—may inspire dissidents to try to mount terrorist attacks against Zairian targets in Kinshasa or Brussels in the near term. [REDACTED]

The Event

Zairian rebel forces attacked the town of Moba—located well to the northeast of Shaba's vital mining heartland—during the early morning hours of 13 November and, with little apparent resistance from the 80-man military unit reportedly stationed there,

took control of the town, port, and airfield. The Mobutu regime, however, easily recaptured the town 48 hours later with a force comprised of a company from an infantry brigade and a paratrooper battalion from a French-commanded airborne brigade. Although Zairian press reports claim that a total of 10 Zairian troops were killed, the US Embassy reports that there was little fighting and have only confirmed the deaths of a few civilians. [REDACTED] only five of the 80 troops garrisoned at Moba reported in after government forces retook the town, and the other 75 are presumed still to be in the bush. [REDACTED]

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The Zairian press claims that government forces killed 120 rebels and captured two. In our view, however, the kill figures probably are greatly exaggerated and are not supported by US Embassy reporting, which suggests that most of the rebels fled before Zairian military forces arrived. Despite search operations in towns around Moba, government forces have not had further contact with any rebels. The rebels are believed to be in the bush in the Moba area and, according to Embassy reporting, still have two senior Zairian officers they captured on 13 November. [REDACTED]

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Reporting from the Moba area has been sketchy and contradictory, but we believe that the rebels' identity can be reduced to two possibilities:


- The Moba attack was carried out by local dissidents. The Moba area has long contained dissidents, including cadre of the People's Revolutionary Party, who periodically participate in acts of banditry. In addition to opposing the government, these dissidents participate in profitable smuggling operations between Tanzania and Zaire. According to a US Embassy source, a recent crackdown by local government forces on the smuggling operations may have precipitated an attack by these dissidents on the garrison at Moba.

- [redacted] places responsibility for the attack on Tanzanian-based dissidents who had Libyan support. [redacted]

[redacted]
 [redacted] an advance team of the rebel force arrived in the Moba area four months ago to recruit and train local residents, who then participated in the attack. In our view, if Tanzanian-based dissidents are involved, they most likely are adherents of the Coalition of National Unity—an organization that was formed recently when the eastern front faction of the Front for the National Liberation of Congo united with the Lumumba faction of the Congolese National Movement. Under this scenario the attack would appear to be timed so as to embarrass Mobutu before his inauguration to a third presidential term next month. [redacted]

Possible External Support

The extent of external support for the attack, if any, remains unclear. In our view, if local dissidents were responsible, it is very unlikely that they received any support from external sources. If the Coalition was involved, however, it probably had substantial help from Libya. [redacted]



In our view, if involvement of the Libyans can be verified, the Moba attack also suggests that Tanzania either cannot control Libyan activities out of Dar es Salaam or has chosen to turn a blind eye. We do not believe that Nyerere would go so far as to directly support Zairian dissidents, but historically cool relations with Zaire, possible Libyan promises of economic aid, and Zaire's recent suspension of its OAU membership might lead Nyerere—the OAU's new chairman—to allow the Libyans more freedom in support of the Zairian opposition movement. [redacted]

Performance of the Military

In our view, the Zairian military—particularly units from the French-commanded 31st paratrooper brigade—responded well to the rebel attack. The deployment of two companies of the 31st paratrooper brigade from Kinshasa to Kamina in north central

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Reconstruction of Moba Attack**13 November:**

- *Rebels attack military base in Moba, capturing airfield, port, administrative building, and hospital.*
- *Radio contact is lost with company of 13th infantry brigade stationed in Moba.*
- *On the orders of the provincial commander and regional governor, two high-level military officers commandeer a missionary pilot and his plane to investigate situation in Moba. On landing at Moba, pilot is killed by rebels and the two Zairians captured.*
- *When no radio contact is received from missionary and two Zairian officers after landing in Moba, of the Shaba regional governor and commander of the 1st military region (Shaba) requisition GECAMINES aircraft and fly to Kalemie.*
- *Commander of the Zairian ground forces flies to Kalemie in a Belgian C-130 to direct operations.*
- *Zairian security officials contact Mobutu vacationing in France to inform him of the attack.*

14 November:

- *Mobutu, apparently at the suggestion of senior military officials in Kinshasa, remains in France so as not to risk overpublicizing the attack.*
- *1st military region, including all forces along Zambian border, are put on alert.*
- *Platoon from 13th brigade at Kalemie sent by road to Moba.*
- *Commando company of 13th brigade at Kalemie sent by boat to Moba.*
- *Two Aermacchi fighters arrive at Lubumbashi from Kinshasa for reconnaissance mission over Moba.*
- *C-130 arrives at Kamina from Kinshasa to deploy troops of the 311th paratrooper battalion.*

15 November:

- *Commando company of 13th infantry brigade arrives at Moba port. No rebel presence reported (town of Moba located 4 kilometers inland).*
- *Company from intervention brigade dispatched from Lubumbashi to secure road from Moba to Lubumbashi.*
- *The two Aermacchi fighters fly reconnaissance mission over Moba and report little visual damage to town, virtually no movement on roads, and two Zairian naval vessels in Moba's port.*
- *360 paratroopers of French-trained 311th paratrooper battalion based in Kamina are dropped on Moba.*
- *French-commanded 31st brigade based in Kinshasa put on full alert and 360 troops deployed to Kamina base in north central Shaba. Troops transported in two C-130s, including Mobutu's private plane, and a cargo plane.*
- *Zairian troops in control of port and parts of the town. Radio contact reestablished with Moba.*

16 November:

- *Zairian troops retake control of airfield and town.*
- *Zairian Government issues communique stating that armed elements had attacked town of Moba, but Zairian forces had liberated town on 15 November. Implicated Belgium and Tanzania in events leading to attack.*
- *214th infantry battalion of 21st brigade based in Lubumbashi arrives in Moba.*

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Shaba and the airlifting of a paratrooper battalion based in Kamina to the Moba area was done in a professional way without major glitches, according to the US Embassy. The troops were transported in C-130s, and, according to an Embassy source, the US-trained crews also performed ably. In our view, Zaire's ability to transport its elite troops into a remote area such as Moba shows important improvement since the Shaba invasions of 1977 and 1978. []

At the same time, the Moba attack also demonstrates that the Zairian military still has a number of serious deficiencies that would hamper its ability to cope with a large rebel force. The military was unable to put an effective fighting force into the Moba area until 48 hours after the rebel attack. In addition, we believe Zairian military resources were stretched to the maximum in responding to the attack. According to US Embassy reporting, military officers were forced to requisition or commandeer a number of planes and trucks from Zaire's state enterprises in order to transport troops. In our view, the shortage of military transport, lack of intelligence, poor roads, and long distances would have presented the military serious problems if the invasion force had consisted of several hundred men whose objective was to invade Shaba. []

Even if Zaire were capable of transporting a large number of troops to a remote area, inadequate supplies would limit the troops' ability to fight a protracted conflict. According to US Embassy reporting, troops were dispatched to Moba with inadequate food and fuel supplies, no communications equipment, and limited ammunition. In addition, US Embassy reporting indicates that military officials were searching the Lubumbashi area for food and fuel in the event that sustained military operations were necessary. []

The actions of the military company stationed at Moba, which appears to have fled at the first sign of conflict, illustrate the poor discipline and training in military units stationed along most of Zaire's borders. In addition, the 13th brigade, which has responsibility for security in eastern Shaba, was able to muster only 40 men for the amphibious landing in the Moba area, according to the US Embassy. These problems clearly

indicate that, other than the Western-trained troops of the Kinshasa-based Special Presidential Brigade and 31st airborne brigade, together with some units of the Lubumbashi-based infantry brigade, the Zairian military remains a very poorly trained and equipped force. In our view, units of the Zairian military stationed along most of Shaba's borders are incapable of repelling even limited rebel attacks of this type without assistance from other units sent by Kinshasa. []

Conclusions

The small-scale rebel attack on Moba never threatened the Mobutu regime and cannot be compared to the approximately 2,000-man force that invaded Shaba in both 1977 and 1978. In our view, Kinshasa probably would have been forced to ask for Western assistance to deal with a larger and better armed invasion force. []

The Zairian press [] are likely to exaggerate the size of the rebel force and its external support, while emphasizing the performance of the military against an externally supported attack, in an effort to show that opposition to the Mobutu regime is pointless. We believe, however, that the Moba attack, coming as it did prior to President Mobutu's inauguration next month that will be attended by several heads of state, has embarrassed the Zairian leader and given the moribund opposition movement a psychological lift. In addition, the international publicity given to the attack on Moba may inspire dissidents to try to mount additional attacks on Zairian targets. []

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
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Niger and Its Neighbors



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Niger: Kountche's Mounting Problems []

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Niger's deteriorating economy—the product of an extended slump in uranium exports and the effects of this year's worsening drought—threatens to undermine moderate President Seyni Kountche's 10-year-old military government. We believe his hold on power could erode if he is unable either to revive the economy or persuade Nigeriens to accept a prolonged period of economic austerity. Kountche's plan gradually to return the former French colony to civilian rule also could provoke opposition among his military colleagues, who distrust civilians and are reluctant to relinquish the perquisites of office. Moreover, we believe Libya may attempt to capitalize on the growing difficulties of its predominantly Muslim neighbor by renewing subversive activities.

Kountche: The Man and His Record

Kountche- [] intent on developing his country as best as its meager resources permit. His austere, dedicated style has been shaped in part by his Muslim background and service in the French colonial Army. Despite Kountche's commitment to political reform and economic modernization, however, he has made little headway in Niger's development since seizing power 10 years ago to eliminate corrupt and inefficient civilian rule. []

We believe a coup attempt in October 1983 by one of Kountche's closest advisers highlighted the vulnerability of the President's one-man military rule. Kountche has failed to designate an heir or establish formal succession procedures, and is dependent on the Army, which put down the coup attempt. The US Embassy reports that Kountche is now trying to accelerate the development of political institutions with the aim of eventually returning the country to civilian rule. He has named civilians to almost all cabinet posts and has established a committee to draft a charter that would become the basis for a new

constitution. In our view, however, Kountche has yet to find a workable power-sharing formula between the military and civilian politicians, or to overcome the military's distrust of civilians. []

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Mounting Economic Problems

Despite the largest uranium reserves in Sub-Saharan Africa, estimated to total over 80,000 metric tons, Niger is one of the world's poorest countries. Only a small percentage of its 6.3 million population have found employment in the small, modern, uranium-dependent economy, which is suffering from a prolonged slump. The majority still eke out a living as subsistence farmers or herders. USAID statistics indicate that this year's agricultural production probably will be the lowest of the century, exceeding the worst year of the great drought of the early 1970s and raising the specter of widespread famine. []

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Prosperity in Niger seemed to be within reach in the late 1970s, when rapidly rising uranium earnings generated 80 percent of foreign exchange receipts. This newfound revenue spurred a short-lived burst of economic growth, prompting the government to begin ambitious development projects. Despite the sharp downturn in the world uranium market in 1980, the government failed to curb expenditures and instead borrowed heavily abroad, saddling the country with a \$800 million debt by the end of 1983. While export earnings lagged, costs of imports, particularly petroleum products and food, have soared. []

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During the last two years, Kountche has attempted to halt the downward economic slide by implementing an austerity program and improving government efficiency. Kountche has called for nationwide belt-tightening and warned Nigeriens to expect several more years of economic hardship. US Embassy

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reporting indicates that the government already has abandoned or cut back on many development projects, cut student scholarships, frozen government salaries and hiring, and reduced operations of several government-owned companies. Moreover, Niamey turned to the International Monetary Fund last year for an \$18 million one-year standby agreement and has requested another \$16 million one-year arrangement for fiscal year 1985. The regime now is even more dependent on foreign aid, which totals about \$210 million annually and comes largely from France, West Germany, and the European Economic Community. []

Kountche's efforts to foster economic recovery were dealt a serious blow this year by the worsening drought. The UN Food and Agricultural Organization estimates that, because of drought, the 1984 harvest will yield less than half of 1983's production, resulting in a food deficit of some 375,000 tons. Starvation and disease have ravaged livestock, and the FAO calculates it will take up to four years to reconstitute the herds. The US Embassy estimates that export earnings from livestock, the country's major export after uranium, will drop 30 percent from last year and fall at an accelerated rate as long as the drought continues. The US Embassy calculates that the balance-of-payments deficit will grow by some \$15 million this year due to declining export earnings and probably will be on the order of \$38.8 million. []

The closure at the Nigeria-Niger border early last year has compounded Niger's economic troubles. Nigeria closed the border to combat black-marketeering and gain control over its own deteriorating economy. The closure has curtailed economic activity in the border region where Nigerien merchants traditionally profited from a vigorous black-market trade, resulting in food shortages and a sharp increase in prices for basic commodities. Although Lagos has promised to open its borders to permit US emergency food to reach Niger, Niamey expects that administrative bungling and security checks will delay shipments as has happened with relief supplies bound for Chad via Nigeria. []

Potential Sources of Opposition

The Military. The 3,700-man military, which so far has firmly supported Kountche, is the only force capable of removing him. We believe the loyalty of the small officer corps—slightly over 100 men—could be undermined if Kountche fails to control urban public dissatisfaction over the economic decline or pushes a return to civilian rule too determinedly. Under such circumstances, senior officers could attempt to deflect public criticism from the military government by making Kountche the scapegoat for the country's difficulties. While we have no evidence of significant organized opposition among the Army's lower ranks, we believe a coup attempt could be triggered by a continued economic deterioration. In the event the austerity program requires the military to accept substantial reductions in salaries or benefits and cutbacks in equipment, the enlisted ranks could become convinced of the need for a radical redistribution of political and economic power. []

Urban Elite. Most members of Niger's small, educated civil service elite owe their employment to Kountche, and, according to US Embassy reporting, traditionally have been a pillar of support for the government. Civil servants, however, have been hit hard by inflation and austerity and are frustrated with the slow pace of return to civilian rule. In our view, they will be reluctant to continue to forgo pay raises and benefits or to accept further reductions in living standards. The US Embassy reports that midlevel government workers were particularly hurt last summer by cuts or elimination of their housing allowances and other benefits. []

Tribalism. Since independence, Niger's northern nomadic tribes—less than 10 percent of the population—have resisted attempts by successive southern-dominated governments to control them. The inability of the small military to police effectively large portions of the northern territories opens these areas to potential subversion. Although [] some Tuareg and Toubou []

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tribesmen may be accepting small arms and funds from Libyan leader Qadhafi, the US Embassy reports that these fiercely independent peoples are doing so to maintain their nomadic lifestyle rather than out of political sympathy for Qadhafi or Libyan policies. Nevertheless, tribal discontent over the north's meager share of power could serve Libyan interests by providing a rallying point for opposition to Kountche's southern-based regime. The US Embassy indicates that the government's slowness to allot to the nomads at least initially an adequate portion of relief assistance to alleviate the harsh effects of the drought this year has aggravated their traditional animosity toward the government. []

Kountche's government also could face eventual challenges from Hausa tribesmen in the south, who make up more than 50 percent of the population. According to US Embassy reporting, the Hausa have long dominated Niger's commercial trade while Kountche's fellow Djerma monopolize the military and civil service. We believe this traditional balance could be upset (a Libyan-backed Hausa coup attempt took place in 1975) if the economic fortunes of the Hausa are threatened or if they feel they are bearing a disproportionate share of economic hardships. []

Islam. According to US Embassy reporting, more than 80 percent of Niger's population is Muslim, but the country's moderate form of Islam has not played an important political role, and we do not have evidence to suggest an imminent rise in Islamic fundamentalism. In our judgment, however, religious firebrands could use Islam to rally opposition across tribal lines by claiming the country's economic downturn is the result of unrealistic efforts to modernize at the expense of local cultures. []

The Libyan Factor

Libya's continued military presence in northern Chad, the emergence of a Libyan-backed radical regime in neighboring Burkina last year, and Tripoli's close ties with left-leaning Benin have raised Nigerien fears that Qadhafi will intensify his efforts to strengthen his influence in the Sahel. Tripoli has referred to Niger as "next in line after Chad" and has long laid claim to portions of its uranium-rich northern border area. Although the US Embassy reports that Qadhafi's

radical ideology holds little attraction for most Nigeriens, we believe the country's mounting economic and social dislocation could offer him new opportunities to further his designs in the region. []

We believe Qadhafi's efforts to establish a permanent presence on the Nigerien frontier will allow him greater access to Niger's northern border area. The US Embassy reports the Libyans' ongoing construction of an airfield astride Niger's border may be designed to establish a permanent military presence in the disputed territory, as they did in Chad's Aozou Strip in the early 1970s. Many Libyan airfields are located along the Libyan border, however, and this airfield may represent another link in the Libyan chain of frontier defenses. We believe the airfield, when completed, will be capable of accommodating any aircraft in the Libyan inventory. []

Based on past practices, we believe that Qadhafi also could try to exploit Niger's problems by providing money, supplies, and training to potential coup plotters or northern dissident groups. In recent years Qadhafi also has sought to encourage domestic unrest by broadcasting propaganda urging Nigeriens to rise up against the government, bribing government officials, and encouraging them to defect to Tripoli. In April 1982, Niger alleged publicly that Libya was behind a plot by northern Tuaregs to blow up the major uranium processing plant at Arlite, 750 miles northeast of the capital. []

Although Kountche deeply mistrusts Libyan intentions in the region, we believe that, in hopes of placating Qadhafi, he recently responded favorably to Tripoli's proposal that the two countries upgrade relations. The US Embassy reports both the Libyan and Nigerien Embassies currently are sparsely staffed, with two Nigerien diplomats resident in Tripoli and one Libyan administrative officer in Niamey. [] Kountche agreed to an exchange of ambassadors earlier this year on the condition that Qadhafi repatriate several

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hundred Nigerien dissidents harbored in Libya and refrain from interfering in Niger's domestic affairs. []

In our view, Kountche—or any other Nigerien leader—will continue to avoid publicly taking anti-Libyan positions. Kountche has repeatedly indicated that he believes his weak nation must continue to deal with its stronger neighbor. Should Kountche be displaced, new leaders, perhaps less suspicious of Qadhafi's motives and in need of economic assistance, could be particularly susceptible to Tripoli's traditional blandishments of quick financial aid in exchange for another Libyan toehold in the region. []

Other Foreign Policy Concerns

France has been Niger's most reliable and largest source of technical, budgetary, and security assistance since independence in 1960. Some 175 French advisers are involved in every aspect of the country's security. The US Embassy reports France has helped to equip a Nigerien armored squadron to be stationed in the northern town of Agadez to help protect against possible Libyan encroachment. US Embassy reporting from Niamey indicates that, although Niamey and Paris do not have a formal mutual defense agreement, France probably would intervene militarily if Niger became the target of direct Libyan aggression. []

France provided about 25 percent of Niger's total foreign aid in 1982 as well as development loans on concessionary terms to finance long-term government projects. France also is Niger's largest trading partner; it bought 82 percent of Niamey's exports in 1981, the last year for which reliable data are available. France purchases the majority of the country's uranium production and is willing to provide price subsidies to maintain a reliable, long-term source of supply. []

Kountche is highly suspicious of Soviet motives in Africa and limits Moscow's presence to a 10-man embassy. The US Embassy reports the Nigerien Government scrutinizes the activities of Soviet diplomats, who complain that they frequently are denied permission to travel outside the capital.

Although Niamey renewed a 20-year-old cultural accord with Moscow last year, Soviet assistance is limited to several medical technicians and some 15 scholarships for Nigerien students in the USSR. []

Iran established an embassy in Niamey last March consisting of six diplomats handled by a charge. In our view, the new Iranian presence probably is linked to Tehran's efforts to upgrade relations with Islamic countries in Africa and to Niamey's attempt to sell uranium. [] Iran sought to purchase a small amount of Niger's uranium last May under a barter agreement for Iranian petroleum products. The deal apparently fell through, however, because Niger already purchases ample fuel supplies at relatively low prices from Nigeria. Niamey has kept Iran's diplomats under close surveillance, and Nigerien officials are suspicious of Iranian efforts to foment religious fundamentalism among the country's moderate Sunni Muslim population. []

The Kountche regime maintains close ties with Algeria, Egypt, and Saudi Arabia, all of which have active embassies in Niamey. According to the US Embassy, Riyadh has provided Niger with some \$15 million in direct budgetary support and about \$30 million in development funds since 1975. []

US Relations

Niger's relations with the United States are excellent. In fiscal year 1984, US security assistance reached about \$10.3 million and development aid totaled some \$19.6 million. Washington had budgeted about \$22 million in development aid, \$5 million in an economic support fund, a \$5 million military assistance program, and \$200,000 for military training and education for fiscal year 1985. Niamey has purchased several US C-130 transport aircraft and receives spare parts and associated pilot and maintenance training under the modest military aid program. Washington also provided assistance to the Nigerien Army to equip and train a new parachute unit located at Maradi in central Niger for the first time in 1983, and a small defense attache office is scheduled to open

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early next year. Emergency food aid from the United States is likely to total about \$30 million by the end of next year in response to Niger's serious food deficit. In his capacity as current head of the Permanent Interstate Committee To Combat Drought in the Sahel, Kountche probably will voice his appreciation for US emergency food assistance to Niger and the region. []

Though unlikely, we cannot totally discount the possibility that, out of desperation, Kountche may make risky foreign policy moves in hopes of promoting uranium sales or gaining additional economic aid, such as allowing relations to warm with Libya and Iran. Tripoli or Tehran could use such an opening to stir increased opposition to Kountche's moderate regime by focusing local attention on his government's inability to deal with Niger's dismal economic prospects. We do not believe, however, that the Libyans or Iranians are willing or capable of bailing out Niger in the short run or providing major long-term economic assistance. []

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Any successor regime, in our judgment, probably would prove less stable and more vulnerable to foreign meddling. Although a new government headed by senior Army officers probably would retain a moderate and pro-Western orientation, we believe less experienced leaders would be more vulnerable to Libyan exploitation of mounting public dissatisfaction over the economic downturn. Moreover, the possible emergence of a radical regime dominated by junior Army officers could afford Libya the opportunity to gain enough influence to use the country as a base for subversion against an even more desirable regional target—northern Nigeria, which has the largest concentration of Muslims in black Africa. []

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Prospects

We believe that Kountche probably will press ahead with his program of austerity and longer term plans to return to civilian rule. Barring an unlikely upturn in the world uranium market, the Nigerien economy probably will continue to weaken, increasing the potential for instability and Libyan meddling. Kountche can ill afford to increase Niger's debt and will continue to appeal to Western and moderate Arab sources for more foreign assistance. []

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Kountche has proved himself to be a political survivor, and we believe he may be able to weather the economic crisis and proceed gradually toward civilian rule if he can moderate the impact of austerity measures. In our view, however, he will find it increasingly difficult to balance the need for austerity and progress toward civilian rule with competing demands from his political supporters that he protect their interests. While Kountche has proved adept at defusing explosive issues and controlling his opposition in the past, he may feel compelled to resort to more authoritarian measures, which would only discredit the regime and provoke greater opposition. []

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Angola: Cultivating France [REDACTED]

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Since the early 1980s, Angola has attempted to cultivate relations with France and a few other Western countries in an effort to balance its ties more evenly with the Soviet Bloc and Cuba. The bilateral relationship that has developed between Paris and Luanda has yielded economic benefits, but only limited political gains. [REDACTED]

Political Goals

In the first years after it came to power in 1975, the Angolan regime was cool to France, believing that Paris was continuing to supply arms to the UNITA insurgents. The countries established relations in 1977, but Angola delayed sending an ambassador to Paris until early 1980, mainly because of French involvement in suppressing the Angolan-backed dissident invasions of Zaire's Shaba region in 1977 and 1978. [REDACTED]

Angolan relations with France began to improve in early 1981 during a visit to Luanda by French Foreign Minister Poncet. [REDACTED]

The relationship picked up after President Mitterrand took office in May 1981. He and several of his top advisers were concerned about Soviet and Cuban influence in southern Africa and believed subtle diplomacy, economic support, and occasional military assistance could wean "progressive" regimes—most notably Angola—from their Communist patrons. The new government shifted the direction of France's African policy by proclaiming a greater distance between itself and South Africa. [REDACTED]

Luanda apparently attempted to trade on the new French policy by prompting Paris into pressing the United States to abandon its support for South Africa's insistence on linking a Cuban troop withdrawal from Angola to a settlement in Namibia. As a member of the five-nation "Western Contact Group" seeking a settlement in Namibia, Paris appeared particularly well positioned to play such a role. [REDACTED]

Although we believe French policymakers largely ignored Angolan political advice, the Angolans may believe their pressure on France succeeded. French officials publicly condemned linkage, and in late 1983 Paris dropped out of participation in the Contact Group—apparently at the initiative of Foreign Minister Cheysson. The French action, however, did not lead to the removal of the concept of linkage from the ongoing negotiations on southern Africa. [REDACTED]

The bilateral political relationship, meanwhile, has not been particularly close. The coolness may be traced in part to Angolan bungling. The Angolans, for example, angered Paris when they issued a "communique" during the visit of a senior French delegation to Luanda in 1981 that they had failed to clear with their guests. [REDACTED]

The French appear divided over how best to promote a regional settlement. The Foreign Ministry's preference for distancing France from any effort to

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link a Cuban withdrawal from Angola to a Namibian settlement reflects a belief that such efforts constitute external interference in Angolan affairs and gives South Africa a pretext to remain in Namibia. On the other hand, US Embassy reporting indicates that key presidential aides believe a prior understanding on the Cuban troop issue may be necessary to reach a settlement on Namibia, and that concerted Western pressure may move Luanda toward a compromise. To increase that pressure, we believe France may be giving some limited assistance to UNITA. [REDACTED]

French trade with Angola is largely one sided in France's favor. France is second only to Portugal in imports to Angola from non-Communist countries.

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By far the most significant French economic involvement in Angola has been in oil exploration and production. A French company, Elf-Aquitaine, is the operator of a foreign consortium that is lifting oil from an Angolan offshore field. Elf is expanding its exploration in this block with credit from a consortium of French banks arranged last spring,

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[REDACTED] Elf also has a 25-percent share in another offshore field, and another French company, TOTAL, has a 17.5-percent share in a third field. [REDACTED]

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[REDACTED] a French petrochemical and pipeline company has agreed to participate with Gulf Cabinda in development of the Takula field off Cabinda. [REDACTED]

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Economic Cooperation

The Angolans have had more success with France as a source of investment and economic and technical assistance. The two countries signed a cooperation agreement in 1980 and have since implemented it in a variety of areas. [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] Angola and France subsequently signed four aid protocols funded at \$300 million each. These are largely for export credits and are insured up to 85 percent by a French Government agency. [REDACTED]

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Among the projects funded have been a technical aid program for reviving Angola's nearly defunct coffee industry, two technical schools to train mechanics and electricians, and a fish processing plant. We believe Paris also has undertaken a variety of other aid projects and has provided a limited number of scholarships for Angolan students to study in France.

[REDACTED] Angola plans to invite France to participate in a project that will expand the country's civilian air traffic control system. [REDACTED]

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Prospects

We doubt that the Franco-Angolan relationship will change much. Even if Luanda were to learn that the French could be giving aid to UNITA, it might choose to overlook the assistance in order to preserve the economic benefits derived from the relationship through the oil connection and French-financed exports. Moreover, we believe the MPLA regime will overlook its disappointment over Paris's inability to soften Pretoria's policies or to unlink the issue of a Cuban troop withdrawal in Angola from a settlement in Namibia.

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Kenya: Improving Regional Relationships

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Over the past year, President Moi has cultivated his image as a regional statesman and assumed a more active role in dealing with neighboring Somalia, Ethiopia, Uganda, and Tanzania. His efforts to improve his regional relationships, however, are guided primarily by his concern for Kenya's internal security.

Rapprochement With Somalia

The Kenyan Government has made significant strides in improving the security situation in its Northeast Province, which is inhabited mainly by ethnic Somalis. Nairobi has combined a policy of reconciliation with neighboring Somalia and a two-pronged internal program of economic development and pacification within the province. Earlier this year Moi sent troops to the province to put down fighting between two Somali subclans. The harsh tactics used by the Kenyans came in for heavy domestic and international criticism, but Mogadishu apparently accepted Kenya's jurisdiction and appeared appreciative of Nairobi's efforts to keep the Somalis informed—particularly since the crackdown impacted most heavily on ethnic opponents of Somali President Siad. Last July, Moi accepted a longstanding invitation from Siad to visit Somalia and normalize Kenyan-Somali relations. Although there are still problems, including the delineation of the border, the US Embassy reports routine cross-border contacts already have improved.

The rapprochement between Nairobi and Mogadishu has persuaded ethnic Somali dissidents from northeastern Kenya that they are about to lose their sanctuaries in Somalia. As a result, the US Embassy reports that more than 300 dissidents have surrendered to accept amnesty, turning in over 350 weapons and quantities of ammunition. Kenya recently granted amnesty to 18 members of the Northern Frontier District Liberation Front's High Command, many of whom are ethnic Somalis, depriving the movement of much of its leadership.

Minister of State Mohamed, the only major Kenyan politician of Somali extraction, has been acting both as intermediary with the dissidents and public spokesman for the government as it tries to better its image. He has played a prominent role on the development side, spearheading efforts to improve regional conditions by constructing water systems and airlifting emergency water supplies to communities in the arid province. His high visibility as a role model for ethnic Somali cooperation could be useful to the government in building momentum for the pacification program.

Moi almost certainly believes his efforts to improve relations with Siad will have a further beneficial fallout for Kenya—namely, greater aid from the United States, which is encouraging the reconciliation. But further progress on mending Kenyan-Somali relations is likely to be slow at best, given the lingering suspicions on both sides.

The Ethiopian Angle

Moi followed his Somali rapprochement with a September visit to Ethiopia. Addis Ababa, although a Soviet client, has a longstanding military pact with Kenya—based on mutual distrust of Mogadishu—that Moi clearly does not want to jeopardize. If relations with Somalia continue to improve, Kenya may see less need to maintain military cooperation with Ethiopia. occasional joint military operations with Addis Ababa have been motivated by perceptions by both countries that Mogadishu is their most likely common opponent. We believe some Kenyans, however, are beginning to see Ethiopia as a greater long-term security threat because of its role as a vehicle of Soviet influence and because of the Mengistu government's alliance with Libya. Kenya has suspected Ethiopia of supporting

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anti-Siad dissidents operating in Kenya's border area, but has chosen not to surface the issue as a major point of controversy between the two governments.

Uganda and Tanzania

Moi continues close contact with Uganda's Obote and Tanzania's Nyerere. At Uganda's request last April, he provided air, artillery, ground, and logistic support for military operations against the Pokot ethnic group which had been conducting raids against other tribes in the Kenya-Uganda border region. Moi also ordered security forces to help eliminate rustling and attacks on tourists along the Kenya-Tanzania border. The action reflects Moi's view that stabilizing the border region is vital to Kenya's interest even if Nairobi is forced to act unilaterally. Providing military support as part of a joint effort, however, has contributed to strengthened relations with Tanzania and Uganda. Stabilizing conditions in the border area have facilitated the resumption of trade made possible by the recent political settlement of the prolonged dispute among the three countries involving the economic assets of the East African Community.

Moi also will be wary of getting Kenya caught between Ethiopia and Somali in their smoldering dispute over the Ogaden. In our view, the course of the Somali-Ethiopian conflict in the Ogaden will have an important impact on Nairobi's relations with both countries. A revitalized Somali military would revive Kenyan fears over Somali irredentism and hamper improving ties. As long as Somalia remains militarily weak and fully preoccupied by the threat from Ethiopia, however, Kenyan officials probably will move ahead cautiously with the reconciliation with Somalia. We expect him to apply discreet pressure on both Siad and Mengistu to curtail support for tribal groups involved in cross-border operations—particularly the use of Kenyan territory for transit to target areas. In this regard, he is likely to play the role of impartial peacemaker, trying to defuse confrontation while attempting to avoid taking strong positions which could jeopardize cooperative relations with either side.



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Prospects

Security issues are likely to remain the key element of Moi's relations with his neighbors, although other potential benefits—enhanced prestige as a regional leader and increased trade opportunities, for example—also will affect his policies. Uganda's inherent instability, however, will make Moi reluctant to move too close to Obote in order to preserve the potential for cooperative relations with any successor regime.

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Uganda: Security Situation and Drought in the Northeast

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A drought-induced famine and the deteriorating security situation in the Karamoja region of Uganda are generating cross-border raids by Karamajong tribesmen that threaten to destabilize the Sudanese-Kenyan-Ugandan border, according to the US Embassy in Kampala. The Government of Uganda has shown little interest in aiding the region, leaving the question of famine relief to religious and international donor agencies. A decision by Kampala earlier this year to withdraw its security forces from Karamoja led directly to the deteriorating security situation. []

Background

Karamoja is the largest region in Uganda, encompassing 15 percent of the country. Its 275,000 Karamajong tribesmen are evenly divided between farmers and herdsmen. The latter have long supplemented their herds with raids against Kenyan, Ugandan, and Sudanese villages. []

Prior to the late 1970s, local police forces usually were able to contain the raiders, but, since Karamajong herdsmen captured several tons of modern Soviet weaponry from Ugandan Army armories at the time of the collapse of Idi Amin's regime in 1978, they have been able to operate largely without fear of reprisal. In 1983 and early 1984, these raiders struck 50 miles deep into Sudan, as well as into eastern Kenya and central Uganda. []

A joint Kenyan-Ugandan force supported by helicopter gunships responded early this year by attacking Karamajong settlements, causing heavy casualties among the farmers and destroying their grain reserves. The operations, however, failed to engage the herdsmen whose raids precipitated the military reprisals. The subsequent failure of the maize and sorghum crops has forced tens of thousands of Karamajong farmers to resettle around mission stations and the regional headquarters of international relief organizations. []

While the Kenyan-Ugandan military operations and the drought have devastated the farming communities, the herdsmen once again have begun raiding Sudanese, Kenyan, and Ugandan villages for cattle and brides. A senior UN official recently told the US Embassy that a Karamajong raid in October captured more than 10,000 cattle from settlements in southern Sudan. In early November, a second Karamajong force killed 20 to 25 Sudanese soldiers and policemen, kidnaped young women, and captured several thousand cattle in southern Sudan, according to US Embassy reporting. []

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The Government of Uganda, preoccupied with a deteriorating situation in the Luwero Triangle, has withdrawn most police and military units from Karamoja, precipitating the collapse of regional and local government organizations, according to US Embassy reporting. Despite requests by Karamajong community leaders and chiefs, Kampala has made no effort to reorganize the infrastructure in the northeast, leaving responsibility for the population to local missions and international aid organizations. []

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Prospects

UN officials and local missionaries believe that by mid-December Karamoja will have exhausted its food reserves and that, unless 1,500 to 2,000 tons a month are provided for the next seven months, a major famine will result. Uganda made a request for food aid to the World Food Program in mid-November, but has shown little interest in coordinating either the transportation or distribution of relief. []

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We agree with US Embassy reporting that, without prompt action on Kampala's part, Karamoja will experience a famine on the level of 1980-81, when several thousand tribesmen perished. We also concur with US Embassy reporting that the lack of a responsive government security policy will engender additional cross-border raids and military reprisals that could further destabilize the Kenyan-Ugandan-Sudanese border region.

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Africa Briefs

The OAU

Still Divided and Ineffectual []

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Although the OAU succeeded in convening its 20th summit earlier this month, it failed to resolve the internal divisions that have caused the collapse of past summits and could threaten future ones. []

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In a presummit effort to gloss over deep conflicts and to achieve a show of unanimity, the heads of state agreed to seat the Polisario's government, set aside the Chad issue, and select Tanzanian President Nyerere as chairman. The seating of the Polisario, the first guerrilla group to have full OAU membership status, and the decision of Morocco to withdraw its membership as a result, set precedents that could cause problems for subsequent summits. []

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The resolutions of the 20th summit were formulated, as in the past, to portray African consensus and were predictably uncontroversial. The statement on South Africa by the heads of state, for example, condemns "the collaboration of certain Western countries with racist South Africa" but avoids mentioning the United States, presumably to avoid objections from moderate states. The official resolution of the summit to be released later by the OAU secretariat, however, will single out the United States and Israel for their policies toward South Africa. The OAU's new emphasis on Africa's economic problems, particularly food and debt, is not likely to lead to greater collaborative efforts by the highly diversified African nations. []

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Namibia

New Draft Regulations To Expand Territorial Army []

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South African authorities in Namibia on 31 October raised the age limit to 54 for compulsory military service and began registering males 17 and over regardless of race, political sympathies, or prior service. An Army announcement in mid-November claimed that more than 17,000 whites, blacks, and mixed-race Coloreds had registered at centers set up south of the border operational area. Pretoria, however, has refrained from implementing conscription in the northern zone, where most blacks live, because support for the South-West Africa People's Organization (SWAPO) is strong in that area. The first new draftees probably will be part-time reservists for conventional reserve and local counterinsurgency units. More part-time forces are needed because Namibia cannot afford a large police force and professional standing army. []

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The new regulations suggest that Pretoria is accelerating plans to replace South African troops in the territory with Namibians, according to the US Embassy in Pretoria. A South African officer told a US official in October that the goal is to assign full responsibility for counterinsurgency operations to the South-West African Territory Force within two years. That force currently has about 11,000 Namibian soldiers in it. They make up 55 percent of all government troops in the territory—up from 20 percent in 1980. [REDACTED]

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SWAPO President Sam Nujoma has condemned the new draft regulations, saying they are preparatory to a South African internal settlement in Namibia that would prevent implementation of the UN plan for independence. He decried Pretoria's use of Namibian proxies to continue the war against SWAPO, noting that it might include drafting SWAPO officials themselves. Political and church leaders in Namibia also protest that the measure could force Namibians to fight close relatives in SWAPO. [REDACTED]

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Sao Tome**Looking Westward?** [REDACTED]

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Leftist Sao Tome, apparently seeking to diversify its relations away from heavy dependence on the Soviet Bloc, has requested a military training agreement with the United States as part of an effort to improve ties with the West. Moreover, the country's Chief of Staff and the Minister of Defense have expressed a desire to visit the United States. Since independence from Portugal in 1975, Sao Tome has pursued a leftist foreign policy and has been a strong supporter of the radical regime in Angola. Some 2,000 Angolan troops and 120 Soviets garrison Sao Tome. [REDACTED]

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Indications of Sao Tome's gradual shift toward better relations with the West include a cabinet shuffle last February in which some pragmatic technocrats replaced Marxist hardliners, improved relations with Gabon which harbors anti-regime Sao Tome exiles, and a reduction of anti-American rhetoric. Sao Tome also has requested Portuguese assistance in revising the school curriculum and providing military assistance. Manuel Pinto da Costa, Sao Tome's only president since independence, has admitted to US diplomats that his foreign policy lacks balance, and indicated this would be corrected. In his national day speech last July, da Costa avoided Marxist slogans and promised adherence to "strict nonalignment." [REDACTED]

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Sao Tome's interest in the West, in our judgment, reflects the deterioration of the cocoa-based economy, rather than an ideological reorientation. The infrastructure has decayed, and most consumer goods and food must be imported. The Soviets have not provided significant economic aid, and the few successful agricultural schemes are done under Western auspices. Despite Sao Tome's moves, however, there is no indication that Soviet and Angolan troops will depart. Moreover, influential leftists, such as Foreign Minister Amorim, continue to control some key posts. [REDACTED]

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Tanzania**Training Mozambican Forces** [REDACTED]

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[REDACTED] Tanzania will begin training a new 600-man Mozambican battalion in December, under the terms of an agreement reached early this year. Originally scheduled to start last March, the program was delayed because the Mozambicans did not send their candidates in time. Training should proceed this time, however, since all trainees are already in Tanzania attending technical and specialized courses. At the end of the four-month course, the battalion will return to Mozambique to train other battalions. President Machel is expected to visit Tanzania to inspect the new unit before it returns. [REDACTED]

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During talks in late October, Tanzania reportedly agreed to accept an additional 350 Mozambican troops in specialized courses—including crew-served weapons, communications, and administrative procedures—which are scheduled to begin by the end of January 1985. Because both the battalion training and the specialized courses are scheduled to extend into 1985, the two sides will reconvene in December to discuss renewing or amending military agreements due to expire at the end of 1984. [REDACTED]

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[REDACTED] Tanzanian military officials anticipate a request to participate in the opening of two new training camps in northern Mozambique. This would require Tanzania's sending advisers and instructors out of the country, a commitment which President Nyerere may be reluctant to make in the wake of current difficulties within the Tanzanian military and increasing activism among Zanzibari separatists. The Tanzanians also may hesitate to expand their military assistance because of previous problems with Mozambique over payment and other obligations. On the other hand, Tanzania's desire to help Mozambique in its struggle against the insurgents and the prospect of obtaining foreign currency—which Tanzania desperately needs—may make Dar es Salaam more responsive to this request. [REDACTED]

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Obstacles to Food Distribution Eased [REDACTED]

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Tanzanian Prime Minister Salim announced to the National Assembly in early November that he had instructed Regional Commissioners to lift roadblocks instituted during the campaign against economic sabotage that began in March 1983. Perishable food items now can be shipped in unlimited quantities between regions. In addition, each person is allowed to transport up to 500 kilograms of cereal for domestic sale. Nevertheless, the government still requires a license for amounts greater than 500 kilograms and prohibits the export of cereals. [REDACTED]

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The roadblocks were set up under former Prime Minister Sokoine to prevent individuals from amassing and hoarding goods. The impact of the regulations was particularly severe on families that owned plots outside cities where they resided because it prevented them from bringing home food that they had grown. Sokoine bowed to pressure to ease restrictions as early as July 1983, ordering roadblocks to allow transport of up to 500 kilograms of grain between regions, but regional authorities largely ignored this directive. Consequently, prices in drought-stricken regions rose more than six times the level of prices for comparable goods in other areas. [REDACTED]

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US Embassy reporting indicates that pressure from the World Bank and smallholder farmers was at least partially responsible for the lifting of the roadblocks. Nyerere almost certainly recognizes that, if he is forced to request additional food aid, his steps to expedite the distribution of locally grown food would help defuse a politically volatile issue.

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Ghana

Government Shuffle Reinforces Trend Toward Economic Moderation

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A mid-November government shuffle has strengthened Head of State Rawlings and economic moderates, which should improve cooperation with Western financial institutions and aid economic reform efforts. Moderates, already in charge of finance and economic planning and the central bank, have acquired the portfolios of agriculture, industries, and trade and now dominate a revamped national economic commission. The government shuffle was motivated in part by Ghana's effort to attract more substantial promises of Western aid at a Paris donor's conference scheduled for 11-12 December.

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The effects of two decades of economic deterioration forced Rawlings to shift from economic radicalism to orthodoxy in 1983, despite the misgivings of powerful leftists in defense and security positions. Accra undertook a three-year austerity program designed by the International Monetary Fund that included the devaluation of the national currency, increases in cocoa and other producer prices, and the elimination of subsidies on petroleum prices last year. So far, the regime has adhered strictly to IMF policies, and, last August, received a 16-month, \$181.6 million standby credit. If Ghana fails to receive sufficient donor funding in Paris, the regime's radical faction—which has criticized reliance on Western governments and institutions—may find itself in a more influential position.

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